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ARTICLE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND DISPUTE
SYSTEM DESIGN
RAFAEL GELY*
I. INTRODUCTION
From its very beginning, the field of dispute system design has been
closely associated with the study of the collective bargaining process. The
phrase “dispute system design” itself is attributed to the groundbreaking
work of Professors Ury, Brett, and Goldberg, which drew heavily on a case
study of the bituminous coal industry, an industry with a long tradition of
unionization and collective bargaining.1 Over the ensuing years, the field
expanded tremendously, and its insights were applied in multiple other con-
texts.2 In the specific context of workplace system design, scholars became
more interested in the non-unionized workplace and so the interest in col-
lective bargaining waned.3 This trend is not surprising given the continuous
decline in unionization rates among U.S. workers over the last several de-
cades and the consequent decline in the practice of collective bargaining.4
To some extent, our understanding of collective bargaining as a dispute
system became frozen in time.
This article seeks to reestablish the conversation between collective
bargaining and dispute system design scholars. Part II provides a brief
description of the system of collective bargaining by focusing on the three
* James E. Campbell Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, Director of the Center for the
Study of Dispute Resolution, University of Missouri School of Law. Professor Gely thanks Pro-
fessor Len Bierman, Professor Mariana Hernandez-Crespo and Professor Lisa Blomgren Ansler
for their helpful comments.
1. WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RE-
SOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COST OF CONFLICT 87–168 (1988).
2. Lisa Blomgren Amsler, The Dispute Resolver’s Role within a Dispute System Design:
Justice, Accountability, and Impact 13 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. ___ (2017).
3. See generally DAVID B. LIPSKY, RONALD L. SEEBER & RICHARD D. FINCHER, EMERGING
SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR
MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS (2003) (exploring the systems organiza-
tions have developed to manage workplace conflicts involving supervisor–employee
relationships).
4. Michael Goldfield & Amy Bromsen, The Changing Landscape of US Unions in Histori-
cal and Theoretical Perspective, 16 ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 231, 234–38 (2013).
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key steps of union organizing, contract negotiation, and contract administra-
tion. Part III does the same for the literature on dispute system design by
identifying some of the seminal literature in the field as well as other work
particularly relevant to workplace dispute resolution systems.
In Part IV, the article seeks to achieve one modest goal and one that is
more ambitious. As to the modest goal, this article seeks to rekindle the
interest among industrial relations and labor law scholars in exploring the
relationship between collective bargaining and dispute system design. In
particular, the article seeks to identify the core characteristics of the collec-
tive bargaining process and how those basic characteristics overlap with the
various elements that dispute system scholars have identified as critical ele-
ments of a dispute system.
The more ambitious goal relates to one of the reasons why the interest
in collective bargaining as a dispute system declined in recent years—the
concurrent decline in unionization rates. Industrial relations and labor law
practitioners and scholars have been concerned for years about the viability
of collective bargaining if unionization rates continue to decline. In re-
sponse, they have suggested alternative approaches to collective bargaining
in order to safeguard some of the benefits of collective bargaining even as
unionization rates continue to decline.5 In line with those efforts, and rely-
ing on the insights from the system design scholarship, this article explores
the possibility that collective bargaining, or at least aspects of it, could tran-
scend beyond those workplaces in which workers have chosen to be repre-
sented by a union.
II. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: BASIC PRINCIPLES
The system of collective bargaining in the U.S. spans nearly two cen-
turies.6 While collective bargaining as we know it today is heavily depen-
dent on a legal framework that is supportive and protective of the rights of
employees to engage in such a process, it is important to note that the pro-
cess itself preceded such legislation.7 This observation suggests that the le-
gal environment, while certainly important, does not necessarily determine
the viability of collective bargaining as a dispute system.8
At its core, collective bargaining involves employees coming together
as a group to resolve workplace issues with their employers.9 Collective
bargaining involves three key steps: the organizing process, contract negoti-
5. See Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining,
123 YALE L. J. 148, 154–55 (2013).
6. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN & HARRY C. KATZ, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 20–22 (1988).
7. TERRY L. LEAP, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 28–41 (1995).
8. See KOCHAN & KATZ, supra note 6, at 69–80.
9. Id. at 4.
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ation, and contract administration.10 Once the union is certified as the em-
ployees’ bargaining representative, the union and the employer will begin
negotiations over terms and conditions of employment.11 These negotia-
tions, particularly in mature bargaining relationships, are complex and pro-
tracted, sometimes taking many months to complete. Any agreed-upon
terms become the collective bargaining agreement. Over time, these docu-
ments are likely to become very detailed and cover a multiplicity of terms.12
When the parties are unable to reach an agreement, a couple of alterna-
tive events can happen. In some instances, the parties can rely on self-help
in the form of strikes or lockouts.13 These actions are intended to put eco-
nomic pressure on the opposing side by increasing the cost of continued
dispute. Alternatively, and particularly in the public sector, the parties pre-
sent their disagreement to a third-party neutral for possible resolution, either
in the form of mediation or interest arbitration.14
Once the collective bargaining agreement has been negotiated, the par-
ties are then expected to implement and enforce the terms of the new agree-
ment. This is referred to as the contract administration process.15 The goal
of the contract administration process is to allow the parties to resolve
“rights disputes”—disputes over the meaning and application of the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement.16
At the center of the contract administration process is the grievance
procedure.17 A typical collective bargaining grievance procedure involves
multiple steps in which the parties have the opportunity to address the disa-
greement at various levels of formality.18 A well-functioning grievance pro-
cedure will encourage early resolution of most grievances at the initial
levels.19 The final step of most grievance procedures is binding arbitration.
At this stage, the parties present their dispute to an arbitrator whose deci-
sion becomes final and binding.20
In short, collective bargaining is a multi-faceted process that involves
bringing employees together, facing the employer in negotiations, and then
10. Id. at 12–16.
11. See THOMAS R. COLOSI & ARTHUR E. BERKELEY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: HOW IT
WORKS AND WHY 55–69 (1992).
12. David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 663 (1973).
13. See COLOSI & BERKELEY, supra note 11, at 33–53 (describing the “weapons of conflict”
unions and employers have to exercise bargaining leverage).
14. Martin H. Malin, Two Models of Interest Arbitration, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
145, 157 (2013) (describing the interest arbitration process).
15. See LEAP, supra note 7, at 370–71.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Peter Feuille, Dispute Resolution Frontiers in the Unionized Workplace, in WORKPLACE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 17, 30–41 (Sandra E.
Gleason ed., 1997).
18. See LEAP, supra note 7, at 377–83.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 407–15.
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living under the terms of the agreement. The latter stage includes adopting
procedures to solve disputes that might arise regarding the terms of the
agreed-upon contract. Dispute system design scholars primarily have fo-
cused their attention on the contract administration stage, given the central
role that the grievance process plays in that stage. However, as this short
description illustrates, the entire collective bargaining process is amenable
to description as a dispute system. The next couple of sections explore this
connection.
III. DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN’S BASICS
The scholarship in dispute system design is rich in substance and broad
in scope, as it has been applied to a variety of fields.21 A thorough review of
that literature is beyond the scope of this article. Our focus is on providing a
framework in which to anchor the discussion of the collective bargaining
process as a dispute system. To that end, this section reviews some of the
existing literature, focusing particularly on several contributions which are
particularly relevant to the field of labor and employment law.
Professors Stephanie Smith and Janet Martinez provide a helpful start-
ing point.22 Professors Smith and Martinez define a dispute resolution sys-
tem as the process or processes that an organization adopts “to prevent,
manage or resolve a stream of disputes.”23 They propose an analytic frame-
work for thinking about design of dispute systems. They identify various
key components of designing a dispute system including identifying the
goals24 and stakeholders of the system,25 the resources that support the sys-
tem,26 and the accountability and success of the system.27 Of particular rele-
21. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for
Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 17 (2008).
22. Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design,
14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009).
23. Id. at 126.
24. With regard to goals, Smith and Martinez focus on whether the system is intended to
solve only disputes internal to the organization or to also resolve disputes with external constitu-
encies. They also note that it is important to identify the objectives of the system. They list a
variety of possible objectives including: preventing or managing conflict; minimizing time spent
dealing with conflict; helping the organization to increase productivity; improve the relationships
among the various stakeholders; improve safety; achieve public recognition; and improve fairness,
for example. Id. at 129–30.
25. Professors Smith and Martinez note that in adopting a dispute system, organizations need
to clearly identify the parties with a stake in the design and operation of the system. Stakeholders
can include the individuals who are directly involved in a particular dispute, or parties who might
be just indirectly affected by the dispute. Smith and Martinez note that in identifying the stake-
holders it is important to evaluate and understand the level of power and authority that they bring
into the relationship. Id. at 131.
26. An important operational issue involves securing adequate support in terms of financial
and personnel resources. Financial and personnel support are clearly essential to the establishment
and operation of a dispute system. Experience in recent years, particularly in the areas of con-
sumer and employment arbitration, demonstrate that this consideration also has implications for
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vance to this article is Professors Smith and Martinez’s suggestion of
identifying the processes and structures of the system.28
Professors Smith and Martinez note that any given dispute system can
be designed to include a variety of processes including arbitration, media-
tion, negotiation, and others. In deciding which of these processes to incor-
porate into any given dispute system, organizations enjoy a great source of
discretion, bound only by external forces, such as the legal environment.29
Relying on the work of Ury, Brett, and Goldberg, Professors Smith
and Martinez helpfully identify three dimensions into which the various
processes can be incorporated and arranged in a dispute system: interests,
rights, and power.30 Disputes over interests can address anything of impor-
tance to the parties such as economic, political, relational, and status. Flexi-
ble structures such as mediation are particularly well suited to deal with
interest issues.31 Disputes can also be resolved by relying on independent
standards such as rules or laws and using a third-party neutral to apply those
rules to a particular disagreement. Arbitration and trials tend to be used in
this context.32 Finally, disputes can be resolved by relying on the parties’
leverage or power.33 Power procedures vary and range from merely antago-
nistic to openly violent.34
Professors Smith and Martinez place the various approaches to dispute
resolution along a spectrum bounded by avoidance at the left end and vio-
lence on the right. In between, they place the various dispute resolution
processes (negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and litigation) from left to
right in terms of their focus on interests versus rights:
Figure 135
the accessibility of the system to potential disputants. Forethought in this particular dimension is
critical to the success of the system. Id. at 131–32.
27. A dispute system should be evaluated to confirm that it is achieving the goals and objec-
tives for which the system was designed. A key component of measuring success is the extent to
which the system is transparent in the sense that it allows stakeholders to evaluate if the system is
operating as it was designed to operate. Id. at 132–33.
28. Smith & Martinez, supra note 22, at 130–31.
29. Id. at 131.
30. Id. at 126. Ury, Brett and Goldberg frame it as follows: “In a dispute, people have certain
interests at stake. Moreover, certain relevant standards or rights exist as guideposts toward a fair
outcome. In addition, a certain balance of power exists between the parties. Interests, rights, and
power then are three basic elements of any dispute.” URY ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
31. Smith & Martinez, supra note 22, at 126.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 127.
34. See URY ET AL., supra note 1, at 7–8.
35. Smith & Martinez, supra note 22, at 127.
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Other scholars have advanced our understanding of dispute system de-
sign issues by focusing on the issue of control over the design process. The
issue of control over design has become particularly relevant in recent years
given the increase in the use of pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment and consumer contracts. As discussed below, the issue of con-
trol in the context of collective bargaining has become particularly signifi-
cant given the decline in unionization rates.
Existing literature points to three important aspects of design control.
First, there is the issue of control over the design of the process itself. In
their discussion of workplace dispute systems, Professor Lisa Bingham and
her colleagues36 compare dispute systems in which the design choices are
made by a third party (usually the state), by the two specific parties in-
volved in a dispute, and by one party (the party with the greatest bargaining
power). Not surprisingly, they conclude that dispute systems adopted by the
parties themselves and those adopted by third parties for the benefit of the
parties are better choices to reach fair outcomes.
A second dimension of the control issue relates to the choice of
whether or not to participate in the dispute system. Professors David Lip-
sky, Ronald Seeber, and Richard Fincher note that individuals should have
the option to decide whether to participate in the dispute system. For those
who decide to participate, they also note, the system should guarantee pri-
vacy and confidentiality.37
Finally, there is the issue of control over the designation of the deci-
sion-maker. In comparing different designs of non-union dispute systems,
Professor Alex Colvin notes that systems in which the parties share control
over who makes the decisions and who conducts the investigation on which
a final decision is based are likely to lead to outcomes that are perceived to
be more fair.38
This very brief description of some of the basic elements of dispute
system design highlights the importance of control and careful considera-
tion of the variety of structures and processes that can be incorporated into
any one dispute system. The criticisms recently levied against certain types
of dispute systems, such as those used in the consumer and employment
contexts, illustrates the importance of control over the design process. Be-
low, the article explores the implications of control design issues in the
context of the changing landscape of the collective bargaining process. This
brief overview demonstrates the importance of recognizing that the various
structures and processes selected operate in a very interactive environment
36. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Denise A. Walker & Won-Tae
Chung, Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the
Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2009).
37. See LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 3, at 162.
38. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Employment Arbitration and Work-
place Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 643, 656–61 (2001).
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and that such dynamic interaction provides both a challenge and an oppor-
tunity to the system designer.
IV. REFLECTIONS FROM A LABOR LAW PROFESSOR
Like the proverbial “kid in the candy store,” my brief expedition into
the dispute system design field leaves me both excited and unsatisfied: ex-
cited because of what seems like a broad set of possibilities in renewing the
interest in exploring the system design features of the collective bargaining
process; unsatisfied because there are many nuances I am just beginning to
appreciate and am thus afraid to take a misstep that might expose my inex-
perience. With that as a background, I offer two observations which hope-
fully will be of some interest to both labor relations and system design
scholars. The above discussion briefly summarizes key aspects of our un-
derstanding of the collective bargaining process and of the field of dispute
system design. In terms of collective bargaining, Part II made clear that
collective bargaining is a multi-stage process embedded with a variety of
dispute resolution proceeses. Part III provides a framework that helps us
appreciate the system design components of the collective bargaining
process.
A. The relationship between collective bargaining and dispute system
design
As noted earlier, the origins of the dispute system design field are
closely connected to the study of collective bargaining. However, over the
years a strange bifurcation developed in the literature. Scholarly discussions
of dispute resolution in the collective bargaining context tend to focus on
the grievance procedure process as the only part that involves dispute reso-
lution. Less attention is paid to other collective bargaining that has a dispute
resolution dimension. This divide has resulted in reluctance by commenta-
tors to think about the use of other dispute resolution mechanisms in work-
places where there is a union, as well as a tendency to ignore the possibility
that collective bargaining structures can cross over into the non-unionized
workplace. My initial observation in this article is that collective bargaining
is very much a dispute system, and a system that is much broader than just
the grievance procedure piece on which scholars traditionally focus.39 In
particular, if we expand our understanding of negotiation and grievance ar-
bitration, we can quickly see that collective bargaining writ large encom-
passes a variety of dispute resolution processes. Below, I use the diagram
39. LISA BLOMGREN AMSLER, JANET MARTINEZ & STEPHANIE SMITH, DISPUTE SYSTEM DE-
SIGN: PREVENTING, MANAGING, AND RESOLVING CONFLICT (forthcoming). Professors Lisa
Blomgren Amsler, Janet Martinez and Stephanie Smith, analyze the labor relations process from
the dispute system design perspective. They methodically describe the goals of the parties, the
stakeholders involved in the process, the context and culture in which the process plays out, the
processes and structures used, and questions of accountability and evaluation.
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used by Professors Smith and Martinez in order to illustrate this
observation.
Figure 2
The revised diagram illustrates that the collective bargaining process
involves a wide variety of dispute resolution processes. These processes
might take place simultaneously and in a fluid, non-linear manner. For in-
stance, negotiations over a collective bargaining agreement are often ac-
companied by a number of activities designed to exert pressure on the
opposing side, such as strikes, sick-outs, lockouts, or corporate cam-
paigns.40 These tactics, which might seem tantamount to aggression, are
common. At the same time, the parties are engaged in other “milder” forms
of dispute resolution, such as formal and informal negotiations, or even
mediation. The same is true regarding the contract administration process.
Before the parties reach the arbitration stage of the grievance process, they
have already engaged in a variety of other forms of dispute resolution, both
formally and informally.41
The above discussion thus suggests that the collective bargaining pro-
cess, writ large, is a complex and dynamic dispute system that involves a
variety of dispute resolution processes. While traditionally these processes
have been discussed in the context of a unionized workplace, one can think
of scenarios in which similar dynamics could play out in a non-unionized
workplace. Of course, all of the individual processes described in the dia-
gram can and do take place in non-unionized workplaces. However, when
taking place in a non-unionized workplace, those processes are rarely dis-
cussed in the context of a collective bargaining experience. I suggest that
while these various processes are certainly linked by the presence of a
union in the context of traditional collective bargaining, one could take a
fresh look at the various processes to explore whether they can exist in a
non-unionized environment as a different kind of dispute system.
Consider the contract negotiation stage of the collective bargaining
process. Traditionally, the discussion of collective negotiations has focused
on the conduct that occurs at the bargaining table once the employees have
40. See KOCHAN & KATZ, supra note 6, at 240–42.
41. See, e.g., David Lewin, Theoretical and Empirical Research on the Grievance Procedure
and Arbitration: A Critical Review, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS
IN THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 137, 137–86 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffery H. Keefe eds., 1999).
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chosen to be represented by the union. While interesting in their own right,
these negotiations tend to be fairly scripted in the sense that they occur in a
fairly traditional format with the parties sitting across a table, exchanging
proposals over a prolonged period of time, and usually reaching an agree-
ment (when they do) at the eleventh hour.42 But as Figure 2 indicates, em-
ployers, unions, and employees are constantly negotiating in a wide variety
of contexts. The distinction between negotiation on the one hand and a
strike on the other has been generally described as a clear bright-line di-
chotomy, easy to identify and clearly distinguishable. However, the figure
illustrates the multiple ways in which employees and unions can exert pres-
sure on employers, and consequently advance their negotiation interests,
short of going on strike. Whether through corporate campaigns, the griev-
ance process, or other collective action, employees are negotiating with
their employers more often than we think.
Clearly, the ability of employees to engage in some of these activities
might be simplified and enhanced when they are organized and represented
by a union. However, that need not be the case. Consider corporate cam-
paigns. Traditionally, a corporate campaign involves a coordinated effort by
unions to exert pressure on employers’ business relationships to obtain
some desired result at the bargaining table.43 Such campaigns require a
fairly sophisticated infrastructure to implement, involving marketing, mo-
bilizing, and organizing. The experience with recent public movements,
such as “Black Lives Matter” and “Occupy Wall Street,” show that social
media technology has tremendously facilitated the ability of seemingly di-
verse individuals to quickly and effectively coalesce around a particular
goal. It is clearly not beyond the realm of possibilities for employees who,
unlike those involved in the movements mentioned above, have some fairly
close ties (if nothing else) geographically, can harness the power of social
media to put pressure on employers to achieve some workplace-related
goal. If given an opportunity to engage in some form of negotiation with the
employer, one can observe situations in which a group of employees, inde-
pendent of whether or not they are represented formally by a union, could
engage in similar multi-faceted negotiations with their employers.
As with negotiation, the traditional perception of the grievance process
is that of a fairly well-defined, somewhat rigid process in which the parties
mechanically follow a series of steps ending up in grievance arbitration.
The process is a lot more fluid than what conventional wisdom suggests,
however. For example, as several commentators have noted, many work-
place complaints are never processed as grievances.44 Some of these com-
plaints are likely resolved through informal negotiations between the
42. See LEAP, supra note 7, at 311–22.
43. Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto, Union Corporate Campaigns: An Assessment, 43 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 505, 506 (1990).
44. See Lewin, supra note 41, at 145–54.
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parties. In fact, scholars have noticed that carrying a grievance through the
entirety of the arbitration process is likely to have some negative conse-
quences for both the grievants and their supervisor.45 On the employee side,
grievants tend to leave their employment faster than other employees. Su-
pervisors also experience shorter employment tenure when grievance filing
rates are higher. Given these effects, it will not be surprising to expect that
both employees and supervisors have incentives to resolve complaints
before formally initiating a grievance. Similarly, there is a well-established
connection between the grievance process and the negotiation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Parties often see the grievance process as a way
of continuing negotiations over the existing collective bargaining agree-
ment, either by using the grievance process as a way of clarifying contrac-
tual terms or as a way of trying to get, through the grievance process, terms
that we were unable to obtain at the bargaining table.
In short, many of the pieces of what we have traditionally understood
as the collective bargaining process fit nicely into what system design
scholars have noted are the processes and structures that form part of any
dispute system. Looking at the collective bargaining process writ large from
a system design perspective might provide some new and helpful insights
for industrial relations, dispute resolution, and system design scholars.
B. Collective Bargaining Beyond the Unionized Workplace
The discussion above proposes that when one looks at the collective
bargaining process through the lens of dispute system design, the hard dis-
tinction frequently made in the literature between unionized and non-union-
ized workplaces seems to be blurred a little. Non-unionized employers have
adopted a variety of approaches, which many times mimic closely the struc-
ture, if not the substance, of unionized workplaces. Unionized workplaces,
in turn, have sought to reinvigorate traditional methods by seeking innova-
tion through, for example, shifting their focus to interests as opposed to
rights.
This leads me to my somewhat more ambitious claim. By taking a
fresh look at the collective bargaining process from the dispute system de-
sign perspective, I would suggest that it might be possible to think of the
possibility that processes akin to collective bargaining can exist outside the
context of the unionized workplace. This section explores the conditions
needed to allow for this to happen.
I propose that the core element is the ability of individuals to act col-
lectively at any particular point in time, even if they do not seek to act
collectively all the time. Encouraging and allowing employees to form alle-
giances on specific issues or at discrete points in time facilitates the opera-
tion of a variety of dispute resolution processes.
45. Id. at 158–66.
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The ability to form alliances (or act in concert in the parlance of cur-
rent labor law), will have two positive effects on the implementation of a
collective bargaining approach of the type suggested in this article: alli-
ances provide employees with the opportunity to exercise some control over
the design choices of any potential dispute system, and the ability to act
collectively is likely to increase the efficiency and operation of the dispute
resolution system.
First, employee alliances give them leverage. One of the key differ-
ences between the traditional collective bargaining process and dispute res-
olution processes in non-unionized workplaces is the fact that in the non-
unionized context, the employer is in complete control. Employers in the
non-unionized context decide whether to adopt a conflict resolution process
and the substance of that process. In fact, unilateral control by the employer
has been one of the main criticisms raised against pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration provisions.46 The traditional collective bargaining process ad-
dresses this concern by protecting the right of employees to act in concert
and by imposing on employers the obligation to bargain in good faith with
the representatives chosen by the employees. While both of these elements
are important, the ability to act in concert and form allegiances is particu-
larly critical.
The ability of individuals to act in concert has direct and indirect ef-
fects on the type of employment-related outcomes they experience. As ob-
served in the unionized context, formal collective negotiations make it
possible for employees to directly affect the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. While the legal framework also requires the employer to bargain
over certain subjects and imposes certain obligations regarding acceptable
conduct during bargaining, ultimately it is the leverage that employees
bring to the table, through their collective force, that creates the necessary
incentives for the employer to negotiate. Protecting the ability of employees
to form alliances will go a long way towards facilitating the kind of negotia-
tion that we see in the traditional collective bargaining process, even in the
absence of a traditional collective bargaining format.
Second, safeguarding and encouraging employees to form alliances
will facilitate operation of the system. One of the reasons that collective
bargaining as a system has been relatively successful and long-lasting is
that employees are likely to come up with better outcomes by working to-
gether than by working individually. The ability of employees to act in con-
cert also has indirect effects on employment outcomes. Employees’ ability
to share information, to help each other in difficult times, and to brainstorm
about solving workplace problems is likely to lead to a more diverse and
46. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration
and the Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 581,
583–85 (2004).
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robust set of outcomes than when employees act on their own. In addition,
giving employees a voice in the creation of the dispute mechanisms that
will be used in the workplace is likely to increase the commitment to those
processes as well as a greater sense of procedural, distributive, and interac-
tional justice.47 Protecting the ability of employees to form alliances will
likely result in better dispute resolution outcomes.
This article proposes considering the possibility that a dispute resolu-
tion process similar to collective bargaining could exist even in the absence
of a traditional bargaining relationship. The article also claims that a neces-
sary condition for expanding collective bargaining in this way is to create
the conditions which facilitate the ability of employees to form alliances,
short of what we have traditionally understood as labor organizations.
C. “Concerted activity” and the National Labor Relations Act
Dispute resolution systems are nested within the larger structure of the
legal system, and thus it is important to consider the viability of the system
within the current legal structure.48 The possible expansion of collective
bargaining outside the context of the unionized workplace faces an impor-
tant threshold within the existing legal framework. This final subsection
explores that topic.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides what is probably
the broadest set of protections among all workplace laws regarding the abil-
ity of employees to engage in concerted activity. In addition to protecting
employees who seek union representation, Section 7 of the NLRA protects
employees who “engage in other concerted activity for the purpose of . . .
other mutual aid or protection.”49 Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unlawful or
unfair labor practice for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees” with respect to their NLRA Section 7 organizational rights.50
Employers’ actions that interfere with concerted employee activity or
with activities for other mutual aid or protection run contrary to the require-
ments of the NLRA. The NLRA protects employee “concerted activity”
such as employee information exchanges and discussions about wages or
other working conditions. This statutory protection is independent of
whether employees are represented by a union, and it applies to nearly all
private sector employees in the United States.
Concerted activities are activities undertaken together either by two or
more employees51 or by one on behalf of others.52 Thus, when two or more
47. See Bingham et al., supra note 36, at 32–33.
48. Lisa Blomgren Amsler, The Evolution of Social Norms in Conflict Resolution, 6 J. OF
NAT. RESOURCES POL’Y RES. 285, 286 (2014).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (emphasis added).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
51. See N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (where seven employees
who walked off their jobs to protest the cold temperatures existing at the shop floor were found to
be engaged in concerted activity).
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employees together lodge a complaint with a supervisor, such an activity
will meet the definition of “concerted” under Section 7.53 On the other
hand, when an employee in the non-unionized workplace acts alone and
lodges exactly the same complaint, the “concerted” definition is not met
and the employee can be terminated without raising an NLRA violation.54
However, there are some situations in which an employee acting alone
might meet the concerted activity requirement. The easier cases involve sit-
uations in which an individual employee claims a right under an existing
collective bargaining agreement. The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), with the approval of the Supreme Court, has consistently held
such activity to involve concerted action.55 According to the NLRB, actions
taken by individual employees intended to implement the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement are “but an extension of the concerted activity
giving rise to that agreement.”56 The concerted nature of other activities
engaged in by an individual employee—such as situations in which an indi-
vidual employee claims an employment right under state or federal laws—
are less certain.57
Similarly, the NLRB has equivocated when dealing with the issue of
whether employees who asked to have a representative present (e.g., during
a workplace investigation) are engaging in concerted activity and thus pro-
tected under Section 7. In the unionized workplace, employees have the
52. See Esco Elevators, 276 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1985) (finding of concerted activity where union
officer raised safety complaint).
53. See Atl.-Pac. Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 52 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding concerted
activity where a group of employees wrote a group letter protesting the selection of an unpopular
co-worker as new supervisor).
54. See Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. N.L.R.B., 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949) (no concerted
activity found. Here a petition for removal of a supervisor was being circulated by an individual
with a personal grudge against the supervisor and the individual was not acting for mutual aid or
protection).
55. See N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
56. Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516 (1962).
57. Initially, the NLRB treated these cases the same as those involving individuals invoking a
collective bargaining right. The NLRB found the necessary link to other employees’ interests in
the statutory mandate of the law the individual employee was seeking to enforce. Accordingly, the
NLRB held that “in the absence of any evidence that fellow employees disavow” the actions of
the single employee, there was “implied consent.” See Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999,
1000 (1975). Years later, though, the NLRB reversed this broad interpretation. In a dispute involv-
ing an employee who refused to drive a truck which had been involved in an accident after having
complained to his employer and to a state transportation agency about a known defect with the
truck, the NLRB held that concerted activity requires the individual employee to act “with or on
the authority of” fellow workers, and not only on his or her own behalf. The NLRB distinguished
cases involving the assertion of a statutory right from those involving the assertion of a right
grounded in a collective bargaining agreement. Under this approach, concerted activity will only
be found where an individual employee is, although acting alone, trying to initiate group action, or
acting for or on behalf of other workers after having discussed the matter with fellow workers. See
Meyers Industries (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), and Meyers Industries (Meyers II), 281
N.L.R.B. 882 (1986). The NLRB today thus generally refuses to find concerted activity where an
individual employee acts on his or her own behalf.
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right to have a union representative present during interrogations which
could lead to disciplinary action against the employee.58 This right, com-
monly referred to as the Weingarten Right, is based on the rationale that a
disciplinary measure against one employee can potentially have an effect on
the interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and
thus, the presence of a union representative is critical in enforcing the terms
of the collectively bargained contract. For the purposes of this article, this
legal concept is an example of the type of alliances employees engage in in
the context of solving workplace disputes.
The NLRB, however, has vacillated regarding the possible extension
of the Weingarten Right to the non-unionized workplace. The Board’s cur-
rent position is that non-unionized workers do not engage in concerted ac-
tivity where they ask to have someone accompany them to investigatory
meetings, which could result in disciplinary action.59 This means that em-
ployees asking for such support are not entitled to receive it and could in
fact be disciplined even for asking to have such representation. This policy
stance of limiting the Weingarten Right to unionized workers serves as an
impediment to the proposal this article makes. The ability of employees to
form alliances is central to the viability of implementing a collective bar-
gaining type system outside the unionized place. Forming alliances will be
increasingly difficult where employees fear adverse employment outcomes
when asking for the assistance of a co-worker when facing possible discipli-
nary action by the employer.
Thus, under existing law the ability of collective bargaining principles
to exist beyond the unionized workplace is very possible. When two or
more employees act together, at the same time, and towards the same
goal—and in order to improve or change a term or condition of employ-
ment—they are engaging in concerted activity and thus they enjoy the pro-
tections of the NLRA. At the margins, such as in issues where one
employee is requesting a representative, some clarification might be needed
in order for collective bargaining to exist beyond the boundaries of the un-
ionized workplace.
V. CONCLUSION
The relationship between collective bargaining and dispute system de-
sign dates back to the very origins of the dispute system design field. In this
article I have shared some initial thoughts on application of system design
features to our understanding of the collective bargaining process. One of
the observations, which I hope is uncontroversial and perhaps obvious, is
58. The Weingarten Right refers to a 1975 Supreme Court decision which protects the right
of employees to have a union representative present during investigatory interviews which could
lead to the imposition of disciplinary action by the employer. N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten Inc., 420
U.S. 251 (1975).
59. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004).
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that collective bargaining is a rich and complex dispute resolution system.
When discussing collective bargaining from the dispute system design per-
spective, scholars and practitioners have primarily focused their attention in
the grievance and arbitration process. This article proposes that the collec-
tive bargaining process in its entirety can be understood as a dispute resolu-
tion system. A fresh look at the collective bargaining process from this
perspective is likely to produce new insights for those interested in the
study of industrial relations and labor law, as well as dispute system design
scholars.
The other observation, is that there might be some value in exploring
the extent to which collective bargaining processes and structures can exist
beyond the traditional unionized workplace environment. While tradition-
ally collective bargaining has been coupled with the existence of a union,
this article has argued that there are aspects of the collective bargaining
process that can be replicated outside unionized workplaces. When properly
understood as a dispute resolution system, one can more readily appreciate
that there is a rich set of dispute resolution processes that exist within the
collective bargaining process. One can also more readily appreciate that
some of those processes can exist outside the traditional unionized work-
place. This article has identified the conditions under which such expansion
can occur and some of the relevant legal issues.
